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I. Background 
 
Part of who we are is whom we communicate with. That basic premise, 
that our family and friends affect our own personality, is accepted even in 
academic treatises that promote nature over nurture as determinants of 
personality (McCrae & Costa Jr. et al., 2000). Social capital, as a theory, is 
directly tied to that notion; we build a fund based on friendship and trust and 
favors – a trust fund, figuratively – and we “invest” in jobs or other relationships 
for the sake of personal benefit. Harvard Professor Robert Putnam’s 1995 
Journal of Democracy paper and the follow-up book, Bowling Alone, hypothesize 
that America has declining social capital. As one critical reviewer, Carl Boggs, 
puts it, Putnam says that America is experiencing a “collapse of networks of 
interaction among individuals that imbue human life with qualities needed for 
community, collective action, and democratic participation [i.e. social capital]” 
(Boggs, 281). Boggs takes issue with numerous aspects of Bowling Alone, from 
the groups Putnam uses (the Rotary Club, bowling leagues, etc) to the 
fundamental notion of connectivity between social capital and political action. But 
if Putnam is right, what hope is there? Ellison et al. believe that the Internet is a 
good generator of social capital: “Because online relationships may be supported 
by technologies like distribution lists, photo directories, and search capabilities 
(Resnick, 2001), it is possible that new forms of social capital and relationship 
building will occur in online social network sites” (Ellison et al., 2007). On the 
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other hand, Putnam believes more in the power of local relationships: "The 
challenge the country faces today is to do the equivalent of reinventing the Boy 
Scouts or the Rotary Club,” and he believes that the Internet is incapable of this 
reinvention (Putnam 2000, 17). 
Has Putnam has misjudged the efficacy of aspects of Internet-generated 
relationships? Recent Internet-aided phenomena like the 2011 Arab Spring 
suggest that the Internet can contribute to social activism, and to a large degree. 
Through a series of experiments utilizing agent-based modeling (ABM), I try to 
triangulate the effect of non-local interactions – those connections that are not 
predicated on being face-to-face, such as the types of interactions generated by 
the Internet. I say triangulate because I approach it from three perspectives: (1) 
testing whether institutionalization of an idea or a political identity to hegemonic 
levels can occur in societies with limited face-to-face interaction; (2) examining 
whether collective action can occur in such societies; and (3) trying to determine 
how a landscape (i.e., an environment or society) changes when its connections 
shift from face-to-face to non-local. Before discussing the parameters of this 
experiment, it is worth outlining the theoretical foundation of social capital, 
viewed from the literature and translated to terms of agent-based models.  
 
Bowling Alone 
Putnam concedes that one form of social capital may be “the Internet chat 
group in which you participate” (Putnam 2000, 21). He later goes on, “The 
Internet may be part of the solution to our civic problem, or it may exacerbate it” 
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(170). Putnam raises four serious concerns about the Internet that he believes 
could exacerbate the problem: 1) Inequality of access. This is a problem that has 
seemingly been rapidly reduced with time, as shown later in Figure 1. 2) Inability 
to transmit nonverbal information. At the time of publication, Putnam’s concern 
was valid, but this problem now seems surmountable with the advent and 
popularization of video chatting through programs like Skype, YouTube, and 
instant messengers. 3) “Cyberbalkanization,” which implies that we will confine 
our communication to people who share precisely our interests. This is a valid 
concern – why search the Internet for something you are not interested in? I will 
explore the possibility that Internet use leads to cyberbalkanization in two 
experiments, described later. Putnam’s final concern is 4) the possibility that the 
Internet will become “a means of… passive, private entertainment… [eventually 
crowding out] face-to-face ties” (174-179). I also explore this question. Thus, this 
thesis examines the type of ties that the Internet can generate, whether those 
ties can be politically meaningful, and the possibility that increase in Internet use 
will limit exposure to external interests. 
 
The Importance of the Internet 
The use of Internet-generated and other non-local forms of interaction is 
rapidly increasing. As a recent New York Times article mentioned, “American 
teenagers sent and received an average of 2,272 text messages per month in 
the fourth quarter of 2008, according to the Nielsen Company – almost 80 
messages a day, more than double the average of a year earlier” (Hafner May 29 
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2010, The New York Times, D1). As Figure 1 shows, Americans are using the 
Internet at an almost exponentially increasing rate. It seems the recipe is there 
for Internet-generated social capital to take off.  
Figure 1: Internet Use of College Students 
 
Figure 1: Internet usage is going up – college students use the Internet a lot 
more than the general population (generally speaking, older generations). This is 
as of 2005 – no doubt the trends have continued. Clearer, larger image available 
at: http://www.onlinecolleges.net/images/SurfingHabitsCollegeStudents.jpg 
 
 Putnam fails to consider several key aspects of the Internet – for example, 
perhaps in the Internet era we do not need to be physically close to those whom 
we trust most or who most influence us. It may also be that the Internet creates a 
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different connection that is also valuable. Recent examinations suggest that 
social media such as Facebook can greatly benefit an individual’s “bridging social 
capital,” and that “the Internet can be a convenient and efficient means of 
maintaining existing social ties and/or of creating new ties” (Ellison et al., 2007; 
Penard & Poussing, 2010). However, other scholars take a middle ground: “It is 
evident from our work that Internet is linked to both increase and decrease in 
social capital” (Phulari et al., 2010). 
The 2011 Arab Spring has underscored the urgency of understanding 
effects of new social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. That 
region-wide revolt was sparked by online activists speaking out against a brutal 
regime, spreading the tale of Mohammad Bouazizi’s self-immolation and 
mobilizing citizens to overthrow their governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and 
Yemen. The revolts that followed the immolation were orchestrated through 
social networking sites in conjunction with more local meetings and protests.  
It is clear that social media are expanding in unpredictable ways: for 
example, one new website, Collaborative Chronic Care Network (C3N), uses 
Internet-generated collaboration among doctors across the globe to provide real-
time second opinions and advice on treatments with proven improvements to 
patient prognoses (http://c3nproject.org/). Another recent example is the 
admirable mobilization of the online community that occurred while Congress 
debated the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA). The 
protests sparked by online activity stopped both acts in their tracks.  
Gur 7 
One notable implication of the explosion of social media is the possibility 
of “diminishing marginal returns” for each connection, or the idea that each unit of 
social capital generated from a connection means less and less since every 
additional relationship may mean that another relationship is receiving less 
investment. The basic premise is that the more relationships one has, particularly 
at the acquaintance level, the less unique and valuable each relationship is. It 
may be inferred that these relationships are less important and, as a result, are 
more easily disposed of or discounted. 
 
Defining Social Capital 
Notwithstanding the intriguing explosion of social media as a vehicle for 
political change, the effect of the Internet on social capital growth is still unclear, 
in part because it is unclear what we mean when we say “social capital.” 
Unfortunately, social capital seems to have become a trendy catchall explanation 
for success. It is often presented like a societal miracle-grow, with benefits 
ranging from better grades to better jobs to better life in general. Because 
scholars measure social capital in so many different ways, it has become an 
easy explanatory variable on which to pin a phenomenon that may or may not be 
related. If the literature would be believed, social capital has its fingers in nearly 
every aspect of society and life. 
Educational benefits of social capital are numerous and well-documented: 
“Several researchers have shown a connection between strong relationships and 
student achievement (Bank & Slavings, 1990; Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Garnier & 
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Raudenbush, 1991; Jones & Maloy, 1988; Lareau, 1987; Lee & Croninger, 1994; 
Sui-Chu & Douglas, 1996)” (Goddard 2003, 59). Other researchers echo and 
dissect the education findings: “attendance at a Catholic school and living with 
both biological parents are associated with a child possessing more social 
capital” (Teachman et al. 1996, 779).  
Social capital keeps businesses alive: “Social capital serves to provide 
sustainable competitive advantages to organizations in the form of 
entrepreneurial behavior (Chung & Gibbon, 1997), firm survival (Pennings, Lee 
and Van Wooteloostujin, 1998) and intellectual capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998)” (Watson and Papamarcos 2002, 538). But it also illustrates the racial 
divide in the business world: “Whites generally have more access to those social 
capital resources than blacks,” resulting in better career outcomes for whites 
(Parks-Yancy 2006, 536-541). 
Social capital is described as geographic in nature, based on local 
interactions: “Social capital is a geographic concept (Mohan and Mohan 2002, 
193; see also Bebbington and Perreault 1999)… based on family kinship and 
locality” (Adger 2003, 390-392). Perreault expands on the notion: “Social capital, 
as a function of social relations, is necessarily embedded within space and place” 
(Perreault 2003, 331). 
Social capital is particularly popular because, as Frans Schuurman (2003) 
argues, it can be so widely applicable, from economists to sociologists.  
Educational sociologists used social capital to explain (as James Coleman 
put it) why some kids do better than others; criminologists referred to 
social capital to explain why crime rates in some neighborhoods are lower 
than in others; social and community psychologists used social capital in 
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relation to income inequality to explain differences in mortality rates; 
development experts used social capital (as in some of the cases 
presented above) to examine why and how some development projects 
fail or succeed; and the worryingly slow pace of democratization in the 
former Eastern Europe was taken to be partly the result of a general lack 
of social capital, which was not facilitated under communist regimes 
(Schuurman 2003, 992). 
 
The breadth of social capital’s effect makes it seem as though one would be 
hard-pressed to find an aspect of society unrelated to social capital. It is almost 
as if theorists would argue that social capital is society itself. 
There does not seem to be a consensus definition of what social capital is 
and what it is not. However, there is agreement that social capital entails some 
measure of trust and that it leads to bettering one’s socioeconomic status, 
whether through education or business or job opportunities or idea dissemination 
writ large. I aim to narrow the definition, and operationalize it in agent-based 
modeling terms, in order to help improve the clarity and usefulness of the 
concept of social capital. Agent-based modeling can contribute to the literature 
and help us learn about the true definition of social capital, and its effects on 
society. 
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II. Agent-Based Modeling 
Modeling Origins: John Conway’s Game of Life 
 The origins of agent-based modeling lie in a powerful simulation program 
– Princeton mathematician John Conway’s Game of Life.1 The Game of Life runs 
on two simple rules: if a cell (in agent-based modeling lingo, an “agent”) is 
surrounded by exactly 3 lit up cells, it also lights up. If, however, it is surrounded 
by any number of squares other than 2 or 3, it will not light up, or darken as the 
case may be. The rules may be operationalized by a single principle, as Dan 
Dennett describes:  
For each cell in the grid, count how many of its eight neighbors are on at 
the present instant. If the answer is exactly two, the cell stays in its 
present state (on or off) in the next instant. If the answer is exactly three, 
the cell is on in the next instance whatever its current state. Under all 
other conditions, the cell is off (Dennett 1995, 167). 
 
This simple principle is not to be underestimated in its ability create and simulate 
important phenomena. 
 The fundamental idea of the Game of Life is that simple rules can cause 
complex results; from the Game’s simple parameter arise very intricate patterns. 
Thus, the microbehavior of agents results in complex macrobehavior in the 
landscape. A particular configuration of agents will, for example, create a “glider” 
– a shape that seems to “move” across the landscape, even though technically 
speaking no agent ever moves. Indeed, it is possible to create entire ecosystems 
of gliders and predators (configurations that specialize in annihilating gliders 
                                                
1 Available online at: http://www.bitstorm.org/gameoflife/ 
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while retaining their own shape), as well as any number of patterns. As Dennett 
notes, Conway’s team: 
Designed, and proved the viability of the design of, a self-reproducing 
entity composed entirely of Life cells that was also (for good measure) a 
Universal Turing machine – it was a two-dimensional computer that in 
principle can compute any computable function (171). 
 
The size of that Turing machine would need to be “about six times that of 
Monaco,” but the theoretical power of the Game is undeniable (173).  
 
Agent-Based Modeling (ABM): PS-I 
 Agent-based models in the PS-I (originally standing for Political Science – 
Identity) platform adhere to a few simple rules. Every agent has a Moore 
neighborhood – it is surrounded by and listens to 8 agents. These agents are 
activated on different identities – a term corresponding to politically salient 
groups. Time is represented by timesteps, the mechanism that advances an 
agent’s identity weight calculation. An identity weight is the aggregated total of 
the agent’s own influence, plus the influence of agents in its Moore 
neighborhood, plus the identity’s bias score. Bias accounts for all factors below 
the analytic horizon, and is a number added to an identity’s total influence – if 
Agent X is activated on ID0 (an arbitrary assignment meaning Identity #0, 
represented in landscapes by the color red), and ID0 has a bias of 1, Agent X 
counts its own influence, plus the bias, to determine ID0’s identity weight for it. If 
its neighbors are also activated on ID0, bias is not double-counted – only the 
agents’ influence is counted. Agents typically have a sight range of 1 – they 
cannot see beyond their Moore neighborhood. If Agent X is on ID0 and has an 
Gur 12 
influence level of 1, and ID0 has a bias of 1, its identity weight for ID0 starts at 2. 
If its neighbors are all activated on ID1, and all have influence levels of 1, and 
ID1’s bias is 2, then ID1 will have an aggregate influence of 10. If that number 
surpasses Agent X’s current identity’s influence plus the “rotation trigger” (a 
numerical threshold representing how much greater a new ID’s influence weight 
must be compared to the activated ID), then Agent X will deactivate on ID0, and 
activate on ID1.  
In my experiments, I increase the sight radius (SR, synonymous with Sight 
Range), so that a given agent can see beyond its Moore neighborhood. I also 
adjust the listening percentage (LP), so that even though agents can see 
significantly more agents, they will only listen to the influence of a percentage of 
those agents. For example, at SR 10, 400 agents are visible to any given agent 
(SR10 means a 20 by 20 grid is visible to the 
agent). I adjust the LP to, for example, 
2.00%, such that 8 of those 400 agents are 
exerting influence on Agent X, and a different 
random subset of 8 agents exert influence on 
Agent Y, etc. 
That this simple set-up can create 
complex macrobehaviors is the foundation of 
agent-based models. Agent-based models 
add capabilities and complexity to Conway’s 
game as a means to create a powerful 
Figure 2: A cutout of a typical PS-I 
landscape. Agents influence the 
agents immediately surrounding 
them -- their "neighborhood." Each 
color represents a different identity. 
Agents with internal boxes are 
"influential" agents that exert more 
influence on their neighbors. 
Figure 2: PS-I, a platform for ABM 
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system that can simulate trends and patterns in real life, using simple 
relationships and information. Models can be as simple as the model shown in 
Figure 2 – a torus with several identities and influential agents based on a 
specific paradigm for a given experiment. However, models can become 
complex. For example, by supplying demographic and geographic information, 
one can create models of entire nations and predict salient political activity and 
outcomes in those countries (Lustick 2003). Such models are relatively easy to 
learn how to create with a user-friendly modeling platform, such as Ian Lustick’s 
PS-I. 
PS-I is a powerful agent-based modeling platform. The program is based 
on such foundational experiments as Thomas Schelling’s exhibition of 
segregation, in which he showed that societies segregate given a modicum of 
desire to be around similar groups. PS-I is Lustick’s simulation platform founded 
on evolutionary and constructivist theory, and is illustrated abstractly by John 
Conway’s Game of Life. It uses individual agents that represent the collection of 
identities most prevalent to a person or group of persons, as well as the 
interactions among people. Lustick summarizes agent-based modeling:  
[Agent-based modeling] assumes that simple behaviors of the interacting 
units at the micro level are known and asks what patterns, distributions of 
outcomes, and law-like regularities on the macro level are more likely to 
emerge given variable circumstances, initial conditions, policy changes, or 
variation in those assumptions (Lustick, 2002). 
 
Each agent has several identities, and each agent is activated on only one 
identity at a time. For example, I am simultaneously a Penn student, a research 
assistant, a member of Mask and Wig, a Phillies fan, and a political science 
student. Right now, I am activated, so to speak, on my political science student 
identity. The others are still in my “repertoire” of identities but are slightly less 
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prevalent; I am constructed of many identities, but at any moment some single 
one is, for modeling purposes, assumed to be most prevalent. Landscapes 
feature hundreds of such agents, and as Putnam would predict, in PS-I the social 
outcomes, including everything from segregation to rebellion to ethnic conflict, 
are based on local relationships. That is to say, an agent interacts with its Moore 
neighborhood. Every agent in the Moore 
neighborhood has its own identity and 
repertoire of non-activated identities, and 
each exerts influence on its own neighbors. 
There are enhancements to increase 
ecological validity – some agents exert more 
influence than others, some agents see 
further than others thus exerting influence on 
more agents, and so on. As noted, these 
simple layers compound to a complexity that 
can create a structural framework capable of 
predicting social phenomena and political 
futures (Lustick, 2003). One example of such 
a framework, applied to the national level, is 
shown in Figure 3: Virtual Bangladesh. 
Agent-based modeling could be an 
optimal platform to identify social capital-
related effects. In order to operationalize 
social capital, it is necessary to examine the 
“capital” metaphor. The goal of breaking 
Figure 3: VirBang, a PS-I model of 
Bangladesh. The squares are 
agents, and the different colors are 
different identities. The central 
region, mostly blue, is Dhaka – 
Bangladesh’s capital. A huge portion 
of its population is comprised of 
textile workers, which is what the 
blue identity represents. Other colors 
include Military (yellow), Muslim 
(green), and Corrupt (white, more 
sparse). The identities are originally 
laid out using a randomization 
function within specific areas – if 
75% of Dhakans are textile workers, 
we give 75% of the Dhaka region, 
randomly, the textile worker identity, 
even though some may be activated 
on other identities (e.g. Muslim, etc). 
Image courtesy of Ian Lustick. 
Figure 3: Virtual Bangladesh – 
A PS-I interpretation of 
Bangladesh 
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down the capital metaphor is to operationalize social capital into an agent-based 
modeling landscape in which agents communicate with one another on a 
primarily non-proximal (i.e. non-local) basis to simulate the effects of digital 
communication.  
 My fundamental thesis question is: Can social capital generated from online 
social media mitigate the decline that Putnam has noticed in social capital 
generated from face-to-face interactions? If so, to what extent and in what ways? 
To address this question I will compare experimental simulation results between 
landscapes with exclusively face-to-face interaction and landscapes without face-
to-face interaction.  
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III. Operationalizing Social Capital 
 
  
 Defining social capital is a multifaceted problem. The “social” part of the 
term seems straightforward to define – something is “social” if it relates to human 
society, welfare, or the connections and interdependent relations among 
humans.2 Distilled, we may call an event “social” if it involves human interaction.  
 The more amorphous “capital” seems harder to define. Microeconomics 
defines physical capital as “the tools, instruments, machines, buildings, and other 
constructions that businesses use to produce goods and services,” while “we talk 
about money, stocks, and bonds as… financial capital” (Parkin 2008, 4). If 
financial capital is invested money (money in the form of stocks or bonds), and 
physical capital is a purchased physical commodity, social capital must be 
invested human interaction with no more fungibility than invested physical or 
financial capital. However, such a definition fails to illuminate some implications 
of the term capital – for example, how does one “invest” human interaction? 
 Social capital theorists, led by Putnam, argue that an individual does not 
invest human interaction, but rather social capital is an already-invested resource 
– social capital is that interaction type that lubricates the process of cooperation. 
Many definitions of social capital implicitly or explicitly include “trust” (Goddard, 
2006; Adger, 2003; Parks-Yancy, 2006; Watson & Papamarcos, 2002; Stanton-
Salazar & Dornbusch, 1995; Meyerson, 1994; Coleman, 1998). Putnam defines 
social capital as: “[the] features of social organization such as networks, norms, 
and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” 
                                                
2 From www.merriam-webster.com 
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(Putnam 1995, 66). The keywords for Putnam are organization and facilitate – it 
is not social capital if it does not facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation, and it 
is not social capital if it is not a part of an organizational network. Since networks 
are amalgamations of connections, often with a common goal linking those 
connections, the “features” he describes are also, in essence, connections. 
Social capital, then, as per Putnam, refers to those network connections that 
ease symbiotic cooperation.  
 
Social Capital vs. Economic Capital 
 Although Putnam’s definition is helpful, especially in its emphasis on the 
infrastructural nature of social capital, it must be supplemented and parsed for 
clarity. For example, capital implies currency – what is the currency of social 
capital? If it is trust, the implication is that trust can be earned, lost, or traded – 
certainly the first two are possible, but the fundamental nature of trust belies the 
possibility of trading. If it can be traded, at the least it would not be for a one-to-
one value – if Person A trusts Person B who trusts Person C, A may trust C by 
association but probably not on the same level that B trusts C or that A trusts B. 
Therefore, there could be a transaction cost for trust, if trust is indeed the 
currency of social capital – an interesting thought worth researching, but outside 
the scope of this paper. It should be noted that if trust is that currency, what we 
may have created is a comparative nightmare, since different cultures and 
societies value and interpret trust in different ways. What is the exchange rate of 
American trust to Japanese trust? Does American trust not transfer to Iranian 
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trust, since those two countries have been at odds for some time? Does trust in 
Baltimore, Maryland mean the same as trust in Greenwich, Connecticut? 
Quantifying trust may be doable, but it is a tall order. Because of this difficulty, I 
will operationalize social capital in a different way – on a landscape level. 
 Can the comparison between social and economic capital continue, even 
without a clear form of currency transfer? The fundamental raison d’être for 
currency is that it is a form of universally accepted debt repayment. One agrees 
to obtain a chair (or any item) and cancel the debt through money. The purchase 
of a chair is viable through the seller trusting the currency of the buyer. Indeed, 
we often buy things on “credit,” which is promise of future money that would fail if 
the third party – the credit card company – did not trust the owner of the card, or 
if the seller did not trust the credit company. Either way, ultimately economic 
capital uses money for the reimbursement. Social capital, according many 
theorists, uses trust itself. 
 But what kind of price tag does trust carry? That is to say – a chair may 
cost X dollars, but how much trust does a given action cost? Putnam’s definition 
helps avoid the debate here – trust is different from money in that the emphasis 
vis-à-vis social capital remains on the infrastructure of trust – an endowment of 
trust, so to speak – that cannot be easily tapped and is closer in philosophical 
theory to the economy as a whole than it is to a specific transaction between 
consumer and producer. One cannot spend social capital, since social capital is 
aspects of social infrastructure (networks) that enable mutually beneficial 
cooperation, rather than more singular transactions. Similarly, one cannot spend 
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the financial economy in a transaction – it is changed by a sum of transactions. 
Additionally, the social capital metaphor implies concepts like social liquidity and 
social fungibility, which reduces to trading trust for money or trust for trust.3 
Putnam’s definition helps us dodge the thorny issue of trust, but given how 
far down the path of trust the debate has traveled, it seems that social capital 
could use a proverbial cosmetic makeover to set the story straight. Perhaps a 
more appropriate fundamental term for the concept currently described as “social 
capital’ is “social economy” – that is, social economy is the aspects of networks 
that enable mutually beneficial cooperation. Such a renaming would seem 
necessary because trust, like other amorphous terms such as love, is difficult to 
quantify and define, which makes it difficult to apply to supporting or refuting 
social capital theory. The reemphasis of the macro nature of social capital is an 
added bonus of the renaming.  
It seems intuitive that a social economy is not spendable in the same way 
Putnam’s social capital is not spendable, and in the same way that the financial 
economy is not spendable. This would make social capital akin to GDP – 
individuals don’t have it, but participate in markets that result in the country’s 
GDP.  A social economic metaphor also allows for traditional economic parallels 
– some people are socially rich, some poor, and most are in-between, and the 
correlation between social economic status and monetary economic status is not 
perfect (although it undoubtedly is worth investigating). In this case, social capital 
                                                
3 Essentially, social liquidity would be the ability of trust to be converted into cash 
quickly, while social fungibility would be mutually tradeable trust – the goal of which 
would seemingly normally be money. 
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might then become the quantity of connections that are part of the social 
economy. This is still a difficult currency – viably trading connections does not 
seem easy – but at least if Persons A and B have a connection, we can focus on 
the objective outcome of that connection, rather than the emotional involvement 
of that connection. Social media, such as Facebook, often encourage such 
connections by suggesting users befriend “people you may know” who are 
connected to users only through “mutual friends.” 
 
Social Capital vs. Social Economy 
 Social capital has become a misnomer. Social economy would be a better 
term, or is at least a better way to conceptualize the parameters of social capital, 
and could possibly clarify areas of confusion in the literature. There is support for 
the notion that social capital theory has not been thought through: 
Social capital is correlated with many other social phenomena but often 
the causal explanation does not match the degree of quantitative 
sophistication of the correlation… First, there are theoretical difficulties in 
linking attitudinal data (i.e. in the case of defining social capital at the 
individual level) with macroeconomic and political outcomes. Second, 
social capital or trust represented as a statistical score does not reflect the 
underlying distributions, which may vary according to national or regional 
patterns. In general this is indeed a reflection of the lack of theorization 
with respect to social capital. Another indication of the latter point is that 
sometimes (the lack of) social capital is used as a metaphor ('a society 
without an adequate stock of social capital is sick') and is not meant to be 
operationalised, measured, correlated or used analytically (Schuurman 
2003, 1001). 
 
Schuurman posits that common definitions and quantifications of social capital 
are severely lacking. He argues that the common quantification of social capital 
as a response pattern on a survey questioning respondents’ degree of trust in 
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one another is society-dependent, and societies view trust differently. 
Comparative political scientists would agree that societies could vary greatly in 
this regard – especially with a concept as fuzzy, instinctual, and difficult to define 
as “trust.” Furthermore, Schuurman points out that when we define social capital 
at the individual level, theorists jump from that individual level to the macro 
societal level without paying attention to logical issues inherent to such a leap.  
What are some of those theoretical issues that so many authors ignore? 
Perhaps the simplest one is that describing social capital in individual terms does 
not make any sense at the definitional level – an individual cannot be a network, 
though he may be a part of a network. It is the network that possesses social 
capital, not the individual. Arguably the name capital itself is at fault; individuals 
can accumulate financial capital, which leads to the misconception that they may 
also actively accumulate social capital. If the aspects of social networks that are 
beneficial were to be termed as “social economy,” perhaps much of this 
confusion would be avoided. 
Frank, Zhao, and Borman argue that social capital is “manifest when one 
actor allocates resources to another” with regard to schools (Frank et al. 2004, 
155). This phrasing seems to be in the right direction; one does not manifest 
social capital – a society has social capital, and it is observable – not obtainable 
– through the actions of individuals. If social capital is not uniquely a societal-
level phenomenon, that would imply that actors within the society could possess 
social capital, and that the United States, for example, has a social capital 
quantity that is the sum of its citizens’ individual social capital. However, if an 
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individual has social capital, how did she acquire it? Does the network enable 
her, as would align with Putnam’s definition that social capital is composed of 
certain aspects of a network? In that case, must not the network have social 
capital inherent to it in the first place? And, if a network gives its individuals social 
capital, how does the network ever gain or lose that capital? Does social capital 
that goes unused simply decay into nothing? Rather than certain actors pre-
possessing or somehow earning quantities of social capital, if we instead say that 
a society has a social economy, then actors exist in a social economy that gains 
its capital not from the individuals, but from the quantity and quality of 
connections made among individuals. Actors simply utilize the links of the social 
economy, investing in various stocks – connections – and playing a socio-
economic game that leaves some wealthy and others destitute.  
In a social economy, an actor can move from landscape to landscape (i.e., 
from city to city, workplace to workplace, environment to environment), and 
certain actors are predisposed to increased levels of communication. The 
landscapes (i.e., the networks) that these actors congregate in will be areas of 
high social capital as a result of the density of their congregation and their 
predisposition to communication. However, the social capital of the landscape 
occurs because of the actors, and yet the social capital does not belong to the 
actors and cannot be used by the actors – rather, it can be utilized. The actors 
cannot use other actors, but they can use the connections of those actors. It is 
not that actors create social capital – it is that actors create connections, some of 
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which may be useful, and those connections are the links that create the social 
economy. 
What support is there for such a theory? Das points out that in India, class 
issues can negatively impact the ability of a class to build social capital (Das 
2004, 31-32). A class is essentially the bonds shared by actors of a similar 
socioeconomic background, or in some cases a similar racial or ethnic 
background, or otherwise institutionalized differences (like India’s caste system). 
Strife among classes could break down the connections among actors in each 
class, which would in turn reduce the social economy of a society. This impacts 
the society at all levels, and reduces the net social economy – and the ability of 
actors to utilize those connections. If the actors are not communicating, there are 
no bonds, and the social economy is weakened.  
 The symbiotic relationship between actor and social economy would be 
typical of a social structure. In agent-based models, as Dennett has shown 
(1995, 169-173), microbehavior leads to macropatterns, meaning that the 
behavior of individual actors causes and describes the patterns of the landscape 
– in this case, the social economy.  
Putnam also lends support to the basic definitional notion that social 
capital is not about the individual. He argues: “Life is easier in a community 
blessed with a substantial stock of social capital” (Putnam 1995, 66). Firstly, it is 
important to note that, again, Putnam is saying a community, not an individual, is 
the reservoir of social capital. He says that the power behind social capital comes 
from the grid of connections – the network – of a society: 
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Networks of civic engagement foster sturdy norms of generalized 
reciprocity… [and] facilitate coordination and communication, amplify 
reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved 
(ibid).  
 
In a social economy, those actors predisposed to utilizing connections are the 
prime facilitators of collective action – the social brokers and traders.  
Further support comes from the “many studies [that] have found that 
unemployment periods can be detrimental to maintaining social capital” (Pénard 
and Poussing 2005, 13). In a social economy, this makes perfect sense – as 
unemployment goes up, opportunities for connections go down, because the 
workplace is a prime location for connections to be formed and utilized. The 
workplace has individuals trying to make connections for the sake of their own 
advancement; promotion and opportunity are often as much about who you know 
as they are about your resume. Additionally, the workplace is an environment in 
which people are forced to work with each other daily, for significant amounts of 
time – even those who do not want to create connections are more likely to do so 
in the workplace than in isolation. The workplace, fundamentally, is a hub of 
connectivity. When there is an economic crisis and unemployment rate 
increases, then, it would not be a surprise to see society’s social economy 
experiencing the same downturn as the financial economy. A noteworthy 
inference can therefore be made – the social economy has a direct relationship 
with the financial economy. When society makes more connections there are 
more opportunities for those connections to be utilized for financial economic 
benefit, and when the financial economy is in a decline, there are fewer 
opportunities for connections.  
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That the social economy and the financial economy are tied is an 
increasingly popular view of economists (Schuurman 2003, 992). But it is unclear 
which direction the causal mechanism takes. The dot com boom of the turn of the 
millennium may offer some evidence in one direction: the boom of Internet 
websites and the resulting financial economic bubble may have been a 
consequence of a major increase in the number of societal connections and the 
networks laid down before the boom, and the resulting collapse may have been 
due to the unstable, superficial nature of those connections (Phulari et al. 2010, 
94). A few good ideas spearheaded the way for the Internet, led to increased 
involvement from entrepreneurs, increased linkage between those 
entrepreneurs, and a subsequent collapse when the bad ideas went bankrupt 
and dragged good ideas down with them. 
 For now, let us stick with social capital and assume that Putnam et al. are 
taking a macro view of capital, and not an individualistic micro view. Social 
economy and social capital are equivalent. In that case, there are several 
implications for an agent-based model of social capital. First, the feature of the 
model that will be tested will be the entire landscape’s social capital, and not 
individual agents’ social capital. Second, in agent-based modeling terms mutually 
beneficial cooperation between agents would take the form of identity building. If 
agents are working together for one another’s benefit, that would mean they have 
low tension (which measures the connections an agent has with agents on other 
identities). This also means that they have the same identity – and the influence 
they have on each other is all a part of a positive feedback into their own identity. 
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Thus, they are helping each other and themselves because they are all on the 
same identity – a part of the same network. Third, it does not follow that the 
entire landscape being activated on any given identity implies greater landscape 
social capital. Social capital theory does not suggest homogeneity in thought or 
action; rather it rests on ease of mutually beneficial cooperation. A sign of 
mutually beneficial cooperation is overcoming of the collective action problem.4 
Agents interacting with other agents on the same identity is a sign of this, but a 
better sign might be a landscape in which a minority identity is able to overthrow 
a regime identity, or at least siphon some of its influence, because even though it 
would be better for an agent to be on the regime identity, the strength of its 
group’s connections means that the agents go against the regime anyway.  
 
Varieties of Social Capital 
It is possible – indeed, probable – that there are several forms of social 
capital (Schuurman 2003, 239). There are two types of social capital common in 
the literature, though many authors offer their own variations. The two main 
varieties are bridging social capital and bonding social capital. Bridging social 
capital is, essentially, loose connections among individuals, the primary purpose 
of which is information bartering or otherwise generally superficial exchanges. 
The second variety is bonding social capital, which is a familial-style relationship 
in which individuals may rely extensively on one another (Phulari et al. 2010, 94). 
                                                
4 The collective action problem is the notion that what is best for a group is not 
necessarily best for its individual members. It would be irrational for a given member to 
take that action, even though it would be rational for the group to do so. 
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Several authors contend that the Internet’s strength in terms of generating social 
bonds lies in bridging capital, rather than bonding capital (Pénard and Poussing 
2005, 19; Phulari et al. 2010, 94). 
Other varieties of social capital are basically similar. Putnam (2000) and 
Wellman et al. (2001) offer three kinds of social capital:  
Network capital (informal relations among friends, neighbors and 
colleagues), participatory capital (involvement in politics and voluntary 
organizations), and community commitment (trust and engagement toward 
the community). Using U.S. data, [Putnam and Wellman] find that Internet 
use supplements network capital and increases participatory capital, yet 
undermines community commitment (Pénard and Poussing 2005, 4). 
 
It may be inferred that bridging capital essentially equates to network capital, plus 
the more informal relationships associated with participatory capital, whereas 
bonding capital is reserved for those heads-of-organizations and communities 
who build strong relationships with their peers. This interpretation is not one I 
have come across elsewhere, but satisfies the definitional needs for the 
purposes of this paper.  
 
Social Capital in ABM: A Simple Probe with Identity Dominance 
 One initial question is how does the Internet affect spreading of an 
identity? After all, since social capital is connections, a landscape with more 
social capital – connections beneficial to agents of a given identity’s own network 
– will have those agents utilize those connections, and seek to spread their own 
identity. The degree and speed with which an identity spreads could be an 
indication that there are many positively beneficial connections. More social 
capital would mean that a good idea that everyone likes would spread more 
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quickly. Therefore, the first experiment is a measurement of the speed and 
magnitude with which a dominant identity took over a landscape. 
 This is admittedly a crude measurement. Social capital is not entirely 
about identity homogeneity, which is what this experiment depicts. But using it in 
conjunction with several other experiments can help identify and isolate the 
social capital of landscapes with higher sight range. These experiments will 
measure how effective far-apart interactions are at spreading an identity 
compared to how effective local interactions are at spreading an identity. It may 
be inferred that the speed with which identity takes over and the percent of the 
landscape that the identity takes over are indications of the landscape’s ability to 
support easy symbiotic cooperation on a network level – which is what social 
capital is. 
 
Social Capital in ABM: Using Institutions 
In one set of ABM simulations, Rousseau and van der Veen find that “the 
interaction of actors creates a social structure that, in turn, regulates and 
constitutes the actors. The mutually constitutive assumption makes it impossible 
to talk about actors without reference to structure (and vise versa)” (Rousseau 
and van der Veen 2005, 689). To fully operationalize social capital, we need an 
agent-based model that incorporates concepts of identity construction and 
identity dominance beyond simple landscape homogeneity, plus rules that 
actively allow agents to work together. Agent-based modeling offers such a 
paradigm.  
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 Ian Lustick and Dan Miodownik’s 2002 paper, “The Institutionalization of 
Identity: Micro Adaptation, Macro Effects, and Collective Consequences” (Lustick 
and Miodownik, 2002), presents an agent-based model of institutionalization. 
They established that, given an initial 54% of their experimental landscape, an 
identity becomes dominant at an exponentially higher rate than if given an initial 
53% of the landscape. They argue that this constitutes an entrenchment of 
dominance, which can be understood as an institutionalization of an identity. This 
has implications for social capital; if the infrastructure of a business is law and 
order, electricity, financial capital, and the like, then constructions of regulated, 
mutually beneficial social interactions – i.e., institutions – are the infrastructure of 
social capital. One can render institutions as expressions of social capital, with 
some landscapes having more face-to-face interactions and others having 
primarily remote interactions. If an identity in a landscape is institutionalized with 
relative ease over the course of the landscape histories, it is an indication that 
the landscape has a lot of social capital. One could then see whether the 
threshold point for institutionalization changes when SR is increased, and 
whether the slope of the curve for identity dominance of a landscape changes 
when SR is increased. That, in effect, would be asking whether an institution 
gains strength from investment in remote social capital or proximal social capital. 
If an institutionalized identity gains strength from remotely generated social 
capital, it will augur in favor of the hypothesis that the Internet, with its 
fundamental basis of remote social capital, can indeed mitigate the loss of social 
capital caused by the increased number of Americans who now bowl alone. 
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 It is important to recognize caveats. As mentioned, increased prevalence 
does not mean that a landscape has more social capital. Institutionalization is 
only present if there is a stepwise function of increasing prevalence that has an 
exponential jump – a phenomenon called hysteresis. If an identity that has been 
institutionalized is put under equal and opposite stress as during the timestep 
before institutionalization, it will maintain its institutionalization. A good 
comparative example of hysteresis occurs in magnets. When a certain amount of 
force is placed on metal, it becomes magnetized. Placing an equal and opposite 
amount of force on that magnet does not demagnetize it, because magnetism 
has become institutionalized in the metal, so to speak. A much greater amount of 
variable force would be needed to demagnetize it. Similarly with institutions, an 
identity is only institutionalized if it requires more than an equal and opposite 
force to eliminate its dominance than was required to institutionalize its 
dominance. 
 To execute this portion of my experiments, I use Lustick and Miodownik’s 
basic experimental set-up, with minor alterations. In their experiments: 
We seeded 11 landscapes at time zero (t = 0) with increasing percentages 
of agents activating the “dominant” (gray) identity. The first landscape was 
seeded with exactly 1200 (50% of the total population) dominant agents 
and 1200 (50%) subordinate (“black”) agents. The next was seeded with 
1224 (51%) gray, 1176 (49%) black, and so forth, until the last was 
seeded with 1440 (60%) gray, 960 (40%) black. We then ran each of the 
landscapes 20 times, allowing each to evolve during 500 generations (t = 
500). Thus, we generated and recorded the outcomes of 220 landscapes 
(Lustick and Miodownik 2002, 34). 
 
Gur 31 
I adopted the same experimental design, to reproduce their effect, but with a 
second set of landscapes that involve primarily far-apart interactions between 
agents.  
 Additionally, in order to try and triangulate the Internet’s effect on 
landscape social capital, I examined another question: can the Internet help 
overcome the collective action problem? Determining the answer to this would 
shed light on Putnam’s concerns about the Internet and cyberbalkanization. I 
examine this through testing the effect of listening percentage and sight range on 
centralized and decentralized authority structures. 
 
Social Capital in ABM: Centralized Authority Structures 
 A modification of Lustick’s 2006 attempt to define violence helps 
triangulate the effect of social capital on landscapes. Although that paper is about 
violence, and attempts to operationalize violence in an ABM, for purposes of my 
inquiry into social capital I focused on one aspect of his model. Lustick creates a 
regime structure in which a central authority figure lies in the middle of the map, 
and from that central figure radiate several layers of influential agents, all aligned 
on one identity. Part of the power of the regime is that it is centrally located; the 
dominant identity creates an institution in the center of the map, whose spreading 
influence is registered by the tendency of agents within and near the regime 
network to activate on the identity shared by regime influentials. My model will 
use this paradigm and measure the effect that a central authority structure has 
on identity formation, in terms of a local neighborhood (SR = 1) and a non-local 
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neighborhood (SR = 10). I will run the experiment such that, in the non-local 
experimental group, there are variable numbers of agents listened to, just as in 
the institutional experiments. 
 The non-local neighborhoods should diminish the importance of 
geographic location, which is essential Lustick’s centralized authority structure. If 
that were the only factor, one would expect the central authority’s identity to be 
less dominant in non-local landscapes. On the other hand, the fact that the 
central authority’s identity starts with an edge may give it that much greater of an 
edge in non-local networks. Thus, if the landscape with Internet-type interactions 
has more social capital, the network’s ability to help its own agents may be 
greater, which means that there will be more agents activated on the central 
authority’s identity in spite of the lost geographic advantage. The key to 
dominance at the end could be the initial distribution of agents on each identity – 
allocation, allocation, allocation.  
 
Social Capital in ABM: Decentralized Authority Structures 
 In order to isolate the effect of geography, I will replicate the earlier 
landscape, but without a centralized authority structure. Instead, the influential 
agents will be randomly distributed across the landscape, though each level of 
influence will have the same number of agents.  
 This experiment should help isolate the effect of geography on social 
capital differences. If the non-proximal experiment group with a decentralized 
authority structure has the same outcome as the non-proximal experimental 
Gur 33 
group with a centralized authority structure, it will be further indication that 
centralized authority is possibly less important in an Internet-based society. If it 
can be demonstrated that any findings from the centralized regime experiment 
are not due to geographic happenstance, but are instead solely due to increased 
sight range and the change in social capital of the landscape, it will have 
eliminated a possible confounding variable.  
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IV. Experiments and Results 
Identity Dominance 
I created a few basic landscapes with the fundamentals of local and non-local 
interactions. Four landscapes were made: 
1. A landscape based on local interactions, where each agent influenced 
(and was influenced by) the 8 agents next to it.  
Sight Range (SR) = 1, Listening Percentage (LP) = 10000 (100%). 
2. A landscape with slightly fewer local interactions, where each agent 
influenced (and was influenced by) 5 agents next to it.  
SR = 1, LP = 6250 (62.5%). 
3. A landscape with only non-local interactions, where each agent influenced 
(and was influenced by) 8 far away agents. 
SR = 10, LP = 200 (2.00%). 
4. A landscape with only non-local interactions, where each agent influenced 
(and was influenced by) 5 far away agents. 
SR = 10, LP = 125 (1.25%). 
The landscape was painted such that ID0 had a slight majority of agents with 
higher influence levels. 4% had influence level of three, of which 1.1% were 
assigned to ID 0; 3% had influence level of five, of which 1% were assigned to ID 
0; and .25% had influence level of 7, of which all were assigned to ID0. The rest 
had influence levels of 2. The rationale was that having a few extra higher 
influence level agents on ID0 would serve as sufficient strength for a somewhat 
“first among equals” political clime identity. 
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 For the proximal landscapes, sight range was equal to 1 – agents could 
see only those agents immediately around them, and affect other agents at a 
range of 1. For the non-proximal landscapes, since the grid was 20x20, the sight 
range and influence range was extended to 10, such that any given agent could 
theoretically influence every other agent. The landscapes were designed such 
that the only difference was the local vs. non-local relationships. This way, the 
only differences would be due to the local vs. non-local variable. Finally, 100 runs 
of 100 timesteps each for each landscape were executed. 
 
Figure 4: Number of Agents on Dominant Identity for Each Landscape 
 
1.25% SR10 means that 1.25% of the 400 agents in the neighborhood are 
listened to – a total of 5 agents. Those maps with listening percent of 2.00% have 
a total of 8 agents listened to. 62.5% of SR1 means that 62.5% of the 
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neighborhood for a given agent at SR 1 is listened to, or 62.5% of 8 agents to 
make a total of 5 agents listened to at SR1.  
This listening percentage variable causes a notable phenomenon – certain 
agents may exert no influence at all on other agents, while others may exert 
influence with more than their fair share of agents. As Figure 4 shows, higher 
listening percentages mean more agents on the dominant identity for both 
proximal and non-proximal relationships, although the difference is more 
pronounced with non-proximal relationships (SR10). Note that the green line 
representing SR1 LP 62.5% is almost identical to – but slightly less than – the 
purple line representing SR1 LP 100% – results for these two landscapes were 
very similar, though 62.5% does indeed have fewer agents on the dominant 
identity than 100%.  
 
Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID) Experiments 
In the SCID replication, as per Lustick’s SCID experiment itself, every 
landscape had four identities, with the landscape divided between two identities 
in a 50-50 to 60-40 ratio between the two identities – 11 total landscapes. Two 
other identities were present, though they rarely achieved any activation. Each 
landscape was run 20 times for 500 timesteps. It is important to note that in the 
case of the 50-50 splits, the reciprocal percentage of dominance at timestep 500 
could replace the highlighted percentage, but for consistency and clarity’s sake I 
listed the ostensibly dominant identity (ID 0) in the graphs and tables.  
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 It is also important to note that these models are very simple – there is no 
influential agent class, only basics. Additionally, border agents that had no 
identity (and neither received nor exerted influence) limited the typical torus 
structure of the landscape. 
Figure 5: SCID Replication with Combined Results 
 
Table 1: SCID Replications Combined Results 
% End Dominance for Initially Dominant ID % Initial 
Dominance LP 125 LP 200 LP 275 LP10kSR1 
50 42.90% 20.21% 22.25% 53.89% 
51 53.24% 50.90% 60.79% 52.52% 
52 44.91% 42.91% 51.61% 53.60% 
53 63.80% 46.45% 67.33% 50.90% 
54 48.50% 36.71% 70.07% 67.59% 
55 33.98% 86.64% 87.54% 64.13% 
56 56.09% 54.19% 59.73% 65.25% 
57 72.77% 78.83% 58.01% 65.13% 
58 70.73% 86.96% 88.31% 73.09% 
59 74.71% 40.67% 38.93% 76.95% 
60 77.97% 88.92% 92.12% 73.27% 
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 Figure 5 and Table 1 represent the combined results of each listening 
percentage. Individual graphs and tables, separated for each listening 
percentage, are in Appendix I.  
The baseline of LP10kSR1, which was the replicated SCID baseline in 
Figure 5 and Table 1, showed significant jumps at 54% initial dominance and at 
57% initial dominance (hereafter, the landscape initial dominance percentages 
will be referred to without the percent symbol – i.e., 54 represents 54% initial 
dominance). This is the same pattern that occurred in SCID – though the 
magnitude of the jump was lower (8.5% in my replication versus 12% in the SCID 
article). The peak was approximately 77% of the landscape on the initial 
dominant identity at timestep 500, which occurred at 59. The lowest point was 
approximately 51%, which occurred at 53. 
 This provides a useful baseline – institutionalization has been replicated, 
and the same baseline files are used through all experiments. Only two variables 
change: sight range increases to 10, and listening percentages ranging from 5 to 
11 agents listened to per agent. 
As Table 1 and Figure 5 show, the LP125 landscape featured several 
major jumps, vacillating up and down before jumping more permanently at 56 
(34% to 56) and immediately after again at 57 (from 56% to 73%). It is unclear 
whether institutionalization has occurred – there are major jumps, and the graph 
does not show a fall after 57, but the earlier vacillations make conclusions 
difficult. 
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 With LP200, as Figure 5 and Table 1 show, the landscape did not achieve 
institutionalization. The minimum percent of end dominance was 20%, occurring 
at 50, while the maximum, occurring at 60, was 89%, with numerous vacillations 
in between. The first major jump was from 20% to 51%, and occurred at 51. 
Another occurred at 55, with a jump from 37% to 87% – however, there was a 
major fall immediately after at 56, from 87% to 54%. The next major jump 
occurred immediately after that, from 54% to 79%. But, yet again, a major fall 
occurred at 59, from 87% to 41% – this was followed by a jump at 60 from 41% 
to 89%.  
 The vacillations show that institutionalization did not occur, but the high 
maxes suggest something else of note is going on – that perhaps as remote 
listening percentage increases, so too does the magnitude of those vacillations. 
 This trend continued at LP275, as Figure 5 and Table 1 show. The pattern 
was fairly similar to when 8 agents were listened to. There was a major jump 
from 22% end dominance to 61% end dominance at 51. The landscape jumped 
up to 67% at 54, and then jumped again at 55 to an end dominance of 88%. The 
landscape fell back down, reaching 58% end dominance at 57, rose to 88% at 
58, then crashed back to a second-lowest score of 39% end dominance at 59. 
The landscape finished strongly, though, with a maximum end dominance of 92% 
at 60. The standard deviations for all three experiments were high – ranging from 
around 10% to nearly 30%, as Tables 8 and 9 in Appendix I show. The high 
standard deviations suggest that more runs are needed to hone in on the real 
percentages for each landscape. 
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 None of the landscapes had strong indication of institutionalization. 
Indeed, at LP200 and LP275, the extreme vacillation suggests that the bias – the 
numerically operationalized random variable that accounts for that which is below 
the analytic horizon – was a strong factor in determining the landscape’s 
composition. Thus, when one identity became fashionable, through luck, the 
agents responded overwhelmingly in that identity’s favor, overcoming any 
potential hysteresis factor. This suggests that the glue of the landscapes not 
based on face-to-face interactions was of a weaker sort than that of the 
landscapes with face-to-face interactions. These results may support Ellison et 
al.’s suggestion that the Internet is a powerful provider of bridging capital, but not 
necessarily bonding capital (Ellison et al., 2007). 
 
Authority Structure Experiments 
Table 2: Centralized Authority Structure (CAS) & Decentralized Authority 
Structure (DAS) Regime Change  
CAS:  
LP 
ID0 
Agents 
Tension per 
Agent at t=1 
Tension per 
Agent at t=200 
125 1087.1 220.5536 100.91468 
200 1281.85 199.4904 66.3192 
275 1162.9 201.4928 78.27076 
350 440.85 207.564 95.65696 
425 1242.95 190.9736 59.12516 
10000 916.75 4.6264 2.26024 
DAS: 
LP 
ID0 
Agents 
Tension per 
Agent at t=1 
Tension per 
Agent at t=200 
125 919.95 228.6328 114.80844 
200 1277.35 204.4408 66.63996 
275 1155.7 202.868 67.34432 
350 436.65 198.3544 71.80396 
425 770.25 189.62 75.18444 
10000 714.65 4.6368 2.40372 
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 Table 2 shows the average number of agents on ID0 at timestep 200 for 
each of the listening percentages in the CAS and DAS, as well as the average 
tension per agent at timesteps 1 and 200 for each listening percentage. 
 The notable findings are that tension remained fairly consistent across 
CAS and DAS at timestep 1, and was fairly similar as well for timestep 200. It can 
be gleaned that the decentralized structure did not affect landscape tension per 
agent. The landscape also further supported the conclusion from the identity 
dominance experiments that sight range increase is strongly related to number of 
agents on the dominant identity – only one of the SR10 landscapes (LP350) had 
fewer agents at timestep 200 on the initially dominant identity than the SR1 
landscape. At timestep 200, every other SR10 landscape had more agents on 
the initially dominant identity than the SR1 landscape did. 
 Another finding of note is that tension per agent dropped significantly from 
LP = 125 to LP = 200 in both DAS and CAS. Finally, it is clear that landscapes 
with a higher sight range had significantly higher tension. This has worthwhile 
implications for Putnam’s theory of cyberbalkanization – namely, that in a 
landscape with far-apart interactions, tension (which measures the 8 agents in 
the immediate vicinity of a given agent, regardless of sight range) will be higher if 
cyberbalkanization is occurring. This is because a large number of agents will be 
on a single identity, but those agents resisting – listening to only their ilk – will be 
surrounded by a sea of agents on opposing identities. The result is massive 
tension numbers for those agents in particular, meaning vast overall tension 
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scores, and larger tension per given agent in SR10 landscapes than in SR1 
landscapes. 
 
Table 3: Collective Action in terms of Dismantling of the Regime, CAS 
Key: Low = Influence Level 3, Mid = Influence Level 5, High = Influence 
Level 7, Max = Influence Level 10. 
Centralized Authority Structure 
LP125 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 41.75 2.4 5.4 34.65 5.8 
Mid 41.3 2.95 4.7 27 6.05 
High 3.95 0.4 0 0.35 0.3 
Max 0.85 0.05 0 0.05 0.05 
 
LP200 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 47.35 24 0 18.6 0.05 
Mid 48.15 19.45 0 14.4 0 
High 2.4 2.2 0 0.4 0 
Max 0.75 0.25 0 0 0 
 
LP275 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 42.55 6 0.3 19.6 21.55 
Mid 43.95 5.8 0.5 13.45 18.3 
High 2.45 0.3 0 0.4 1.85 
Max 0.75 0.1 0 0.15 0 
 
LP350 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 18.3 35.8 0 19.95 15.95 
Mid 22.5 31.1 0 15.25 13.15 
High 0 3.05 0 0.8 1.15 
Max 0 1 0 0 0 
 
LP425 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 45.05 0 0 22.5 22.45 
Mid 47.55 0 0 17.05 17.4 
High 2.95 0 0 1 1.05 
Max 1 0 0 0 0 
 
LP10000 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 38.55 13.65 8.6 11.65 17.55 
Mid 32.8 11.5 10.1 10.7 16.9 
High 4.05 0 0.95 0 0 
Max 0.8 0 0 0 0.2 
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 Table 3 shows the degree to which the centralized authority structure was 
dismantled at each listening percentage. Each row shows the number of each 
type of influential – low influence level of 3, medium = 5, high = 7, and max = 10 
– on each identity at each listening percentage. Initial influential totals were: 45 
low-level, 42 mid-level, 5 high-level, and 1 max-level influentials activated on ID0, 
and 45 low-level and 42 mid-level influentials activated with a random distribution 
on the other identities. 
Table 4: Collective Action in terms of Dismantling the Regime, DAS 
Decentralized Authority Structure 
LP125 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 40.6 7.9 7.35 23.1 11.05 
Mid 30.8 8.25 6.15 26.5 10.3 
High 2.7 0.15 0 2 0.15 
Max 0 0 0 1 0 
 
LP200 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 53.35 20.05 2.45 12.2 1.95 
Mid 38.1 30.15 0.4 12.05 1.3 
High 3 1.4 0 0.6 0 
Max 0 0.4 0 0.6 0 
 
LP275 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 46.3 24.4 0.95 17.7 0.65 
Mid 33.55 32.4 0.85 14.55 0.65 
High 2.6 2.2 0 0.2 0 
Max 0 1 0 0 0 
 
LP350 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 18.5 51.35 0 19.75 0.4 
Mid 12.45 52.3 0 17.25 0 
High 1 3.4 0 0.6 0 
Max 0 1 0 0 0 
 
LP425 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
Low 31.65 4.35 0 39.8 14.2 
Mid 25.75 3.8 0 30.95 21.5 
High 3 0 0 0 2 
Max 0 0 0 0 1 
 
LP10000 ID0 ID1 ID2 ID3 ID4 
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Low 39.45 14.4 9.5 13.7 12.95 
Mid 36.95 15.1 9.45 8.35 12.15 
High 2.45 0.3 1 0 1.25 
Max 0.75 0 0 0.2 0.05 
  
Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of influentials across listening 
percentages and identities for the centralized and decentralized authority 
structures, respectively. Using SR1 LP10k as the baseline, the trend is that in the 
SR10 landscapes, as listening percentage increases, the number of influentials 
activated on the dominant identity (ID0) declines. Those identities that took 
higher-level influentials from the regime structure also added more low and mid-
level influentials, suggesting a correlation between obtaining higher-level 
influential agents and obtaining lower-level influential agents. Just how strong is 
this relationship? 
 
Table 5: Correlations of Max Influential to Other Influentials 
 
Correlation (r) 
 DAS CAS 
Max to Low 0.3101 0.8062 
Max to Med 0.5504 0.8414 
Max to High 0.5198 0.872 
 
The regime structures seemed to follow the high-level influentials and the 
max-level influential with varying strength. As Table 5 shows, having those 
upper-tier influentials correlates highly to having lower-tier influentials, showing 
that the regime structure did work. The correlations were consistently strong in 
the CAS – having a higher percentage of max level influentials over the course of 
a run correlated to having a higher percentage of lower level influentials with r = 
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.8062, but correlated more strongly as the influential level went up – with r = 
.8414 for medium influentials, and r = .872 for high-level influentials. The DAS 
showed a significantly weaker pattern of relationship, with a max influential to low 
influential correlation of r = .3101, a max to medium correlation of r = .5504, and 
a max to high-level influentials correlation of r = .5198. These scores show that 
the regime was very tight in the centralized authority structure, and weak to 
moderately strong in the decentralized structure. 
 Overall, as listening percentage increased the number of influentials on 
the dominant identity declined both on the DAS and CAS landscapes. Therefore, 
there seems to be some collective action against the regime occurring in this 
model not due to geographic factors or initial landscape layout. 
 For pictures of snapshots from various experiments, consult Appendix II. 
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V. Conclusions 
Identity Dominance 
 The results show that increasing sight range while holding all else 
constant – including listening percentage – creates landscapes in which the 
dominant identity takes over more quickly and more completely (Figure 4).  
As I mentioned earlier, prevalence must not be equated to 
institutionalization. However, if the increase in SR had resulted in drastically 
reduced identity dominance, it would be a major argument against the notion that 
increasing sight range has a positive effect on landscape social capital. It would 
imply fewer utilizable connections made, and cause gridlock on initial identities. A 
landscape in gridlock does not seem like one in which there are connections 
utilizable for mutually beneficial purposes. Though identity prevalence does not 
equate to institutionalization, or to a landscape’s social capital, it is related to it. 
The drastic increase in identity prevalence in SR10 landscapes versus SR1 
landscapes offers another nod to the power of the Internet. 
 
SCID Experiment 
It is clear from the graphs and tables that the increase of sight range and 
simultaneous increase of number of agents listened to resulted in a complete 
dismantling of institutionalization. Issues translating the landscapes from an older 
model into a newer platform may explain a portion of this, but this does not seem 
like a major explanatory factor. When the original files were used, 
institutionalization occurred. Because the institutionalization still occurred with the 
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original files even in the new platform, I proceeded with the actual experiment of 
increasing sight range and adjusting listening percentage. 
When the sight range was increased and the listening percentage 
decreased (LP125, Figure 5), institutionalization never conclusively occurred. At 
LP125, the landscape did seem to achieve some consistency that may have 
been institutionalization – more experiments would be needed to confirm or 
refute this possibility. This finding suggests that when fewer agents are listened 
to over a larger space, institutionalization may still occur. As the number of 
agents listened to increases, the presence of institutionalization definitely 
evaporates – as Figure 5 (as well as Figures 8 and 9 in Appendix I) shows, even 
when an institutional level jump occurred, it was not maintained. However, higher 
maxima were achieved as listening percentage increased, reaching above 90% 
(Table 1). This is a significantly higher percentage than the 77% maximum of the 
SCID SR1 LP10k baseline replication. Therefore, having a higher number of 
agents to influence and be influenced by resulted in greater ultimate magnitude 
of identity dominance, and high dominance is a characteristic of an 
institutionalized identity. But, institutionalization implies continued dominance 
once a threshold is crossed. That continuity could not be established – either the 
sample size was too small, as the very high standard deviations suggest (Tables 
8 and 9 in Appendix I), or remote interaction leads to weakened institutions. 
Therefore, it is impossible to say with the current set of experiments that remote 
interactions increase the net social capital of a landscape from the point of view 
of ease of institution-formation, because institutionalization did not occur more 
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quickly in landscapes with higher sight range and listening percent – indeed, 
institutionalization did not conclusively occur at all. 
Several theorists agree that far-apart interactions generate bridging 
capital, and the present experiment shows that phenomenon. Indeed, this effect 
is visible in today’s society. With increased interconnectivity across a wider 
space, random luck – bias – plays a bigger role, and, as the models suggest, 
whatever “idea” happens to be in vogue spreads like wildfire and then fizzles out, 
only to return to glory or be replaced by another idea. As mentioned earlier, one 
important example is the 2011 Arab Spring, when a combination of local activism 
and online activism changed the face of the Middle East. An even more recent 
example is the online-spurred protests that killed the SOPA and PIPA acts in 
Congress. One quaint real life example experienced across college campuses is 
the phenomenon called “icing.” Students would surprise their peers with a bottle 
of Smirnoff Ice – a carbonated, flavored alcoholic beverage – at which point the 
victim gets on his or her knee and chug the entire bottle. Such a fad is, of course, 
utterly ridiculous, and without logic or reason – but it caught on, for one reason or 
another, and became exceptionally popular. As quick as it rose, it fell off the map, 
in favor of the next fad. Another similar phenomenon has been the oddity that is 
“planking,” which is the art of taking a picture of a person lying down horizontally 
– no more, no less – in an odd context or on an interesting surface. Such images 
are then put on the Internet and accumulate thousands of views. These ideas are 
silly, but represent an important phenomenon that is part of our developing 
society – a society that increasingly revolves around the Internet. 
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Perhaps what the models show us is that while an idea may see 
institutional-level dominance in societies with large amounts of remote 
interaction, the institutional-level structural maintenance is more difficult in 
societies with primarily far-apart interactions. Essentially, perhaps the Internet 
does mitigate social capital decline, in that it does allow the aspects of networks 
that are beneficial to exert their positive effect on their own identity. But, perhaps 
the Internet simultaneously magnifies the fickle nature of society.  
Theorists’ suggestions that the Internet increases bridging social capital 
without touching bonding social capital again comes into play. Perhaps bridging 
social capital aids identity spread and actually creates the institution, but the 
bonding social capital – those face-to-face interactions that cement relationships 
– provide the glue that maintains the institution. The SCID experiment provides 
support to Putnam’s notion ”that meeting in an electronic forum is not the 
equivalent of meeting in a bowling alley” (Putnam 1995, 74). The experiment also 
supports the assertion of Ellison et al. that:  
Bridging social capital might be augmented by such [online social network] sites, 
which support loose social ties, allowing users to create and maintain larger, 
diffuse networks of relationships from which they could potentially draw 
resources (Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007, 1146).   
 
Certainly this experiment is not conclusive, but it provides a unique perspective 
that lends support to a theory of the Internet. When an agent listens to many 
agents, it has a significant amount of information at its fingertips, and can make 
the most informed decision for itself – it can focus on being that which is best for 
itself, as opposed to taking a more limited view of toeing the local party line. 
Ultimately, this contributes to answering the fundamental question of whether or 
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not the Internet can mitigate the decline in social capital – the SCID experiment 
suggests that the Internet can mitigate certain forms of that decline, but also 
indicates that bowling online does not forge the bonds of brotherhood that 
bowling in leagues apparently can. 
 
Centralized and Decentralized Authority Structures 
 The notion that landscapes with higher sight range support more bridging 
social capital, but not bonding social capital, finds further support in the CAS and 
DAS experiments. Again we recall the Arab Spring, when the Egyptian authority 
structure was taken down through initially far-apart interactions. Perhaps Egypt’s 
social capital shifted from being primarily bonding to primarily bridging, allowing 
for the kind of tumultuous identity shift seen in the SCID experiment (Figure 5). 
As sight range and listening percentage increased, the CAS and DAS models 
featured increasing numbers of influential agents defecting from the authority 
regime, suggesting that strong bonds are not necessary to overthrow a regime. 
Bridging capital, perhaps ineffective at maintaining regimes, nevertheless seems 
to excel at removing them. 
 Another notable aspect of the CAS and DAS experiments is the support 
they lend to Putnam’s concerns over the possibility of cyberbalkanization. The 
CAS and DAS landscapes featured very high tensions, and as Appendix II 
shows, the characteristic of these landscapes is mostly uniform, with a few 
agents surrounded by a sea of opposition-identity agents. Tension measures 
oppositional identities in a local neighborhood – the 8 agents around a given 
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agent. The hallmark of cyberbalkanization in high sight range landscapes would 
be high tension, since that means a largely homogenous landscape, in which 
agents listen only to agents on their own identity, dotted by a few contrarian 
agents in an isolated static network of their own. Because a few of those agents 
will not activate on the dominant identity, those agents experience large tension.   
 
Triangulation Conclusions 
 Several conclusions can be gleaned from these studies. Firstly, one of the 
major questions was to test whether the far-apart interactions can generate 
institutionalization the same way that face-to-face interactions can, and if so 
whether or not far-apart interactions could lower that institutionalization threshold. 
If they could lower the threshold, that would be an indication that an institution 
can more easily help its own agents in a high sight-range landscape, which 
would be an indication of more social capital in that landscape. The answer to 
that question is that far-apart interactions, in this study, cannot generate 
institutionalization in the same way face-to-face interactions can, meaning that 
the landscape’s social capital is probably not increased when sight range 
increases. However, the identity dominance experiment demonstrated quite 
conclusively that increasing SR increases the speed and magnitude with which a 
dominant identity takes over a landscape, which is a proxy for how quickly and 
totally an idea or a political group can spread. Given the multiple types of social 
capital, the ease and totality with which identities spread, and the inability to 
maintain institutional status even when dominance is achieved, this study 
Gur 52 
suggests that far-apart interactions increase a landscape’s ratio of bridging to 
bonding social capital. 
 This notion is supported by the CAS and DAS experiments, which show 
that collective action can be initiated from non-local interaction, and that regimes 
can be dismantled to some degree by far-apart interactions, just like the Arab 
Spring has shown. The regime structure, while weakened, did not disappear in 
any landscapes, suggesting perhaps that some local interactions are necessary 
to fully dismantle an authority structure.  
 The CAS and DAS studies further support Putnam’s notion of 
cyberbalkanization due to the high tension in the landscape. It would be worth 
investigating methods of limiting this cyberbalkanization, as well as examining 
mixtures of local and non-local interaction that break apart a regime, and 
mixtures that create a maximally effective institution. Possibly, there is a sweet 
spot between far-apart interactions and local interactions that prevents 
cyberbalkanization, enables institutionalization, and lubricates collective action. 
Such a study would also be more representative of real life – very few people 
have purely face-to-face interactions anymore, and very few have purely far-
apart interactions. This study tried to replicate that, by having SR10 landscapes 
on a 50 by 50 grid, meaning an agent was more likely to interact with an agent 
closer to it than with an agent on the other side of the landscape. Refining this 
method to enable agents to listen to portions of their Moore neighborhood, plus 
farther away agents, would be a closer approximation of real life. Most of us 
reside somewhere on a continuum of local vs. non-local interactions, and 
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operationalizing that continuum ought to be the next step in determining how the 
Internet and its rampant growth affect our society.  
Finally, the standard deviations in the SCID experiment suggest that, 
given the current paradigm, far more histories are necessary to establish more 
certain results. This may be because, in a given landscape with remote listening, 
it is entirely possible that numerous agents are completely ignored – nothing in 
the model guarantees an agent will influence another agent, only that they will 
listen to other agents. This effect would be mitigated with more trials.   
If future experiments refine the landscapes’ listening rules and increase 
the number of trials, agent-based modeling could contribute the conversation 
about the effect of the Internet on society. It seems, at least, worth exploring. 
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Appendix I: Tables and Graphs 
Figure 6: SCID Replication with Sight Radius 1, Listening Percentage 100% 
(Every agent listens to 8 other agents) 
 
 
Table 5: SCID Replication with SR = 1, LP = 100% 
% Initial Dominance % End Dominance for Initial DI 
50 53.889 
51 52.517 
52 53.600 
53 50.896 
54 67.594 
55 64.133 
56 65.254 
57 65.127 
58 73.090 
59 76.948 
60 73.267 
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Figure 7: SCID Experiment with Sight Radius 10, Listening Percentage 
1.25% (Every agent listens to 5 other agents) 
 
 
 
Table 7: SCID Experiment with SR = 10, LP = 1.25% (5 agents listened to) 
% Initial 
Dominance 
% End Dominance 
for Initial Dominant 
Identity 
Standard 
Deviation 
50 42.90% 12.69% 
51 53.24% 10.65% 
52 44.91% 13.72% 
53 63.80% 13.33% 
54 48.50% 10.89% 
55 33.98% 9.97% 
56 56.09% 13.06% 
57 72.77% 10.14% 
58 70.73% 11.51% 
59 74.71% 7.43% 
60 77.97% 9.34% 
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Figure 8: SCID Experiment with Sight Radius 10, Listening Percentage 
2.00% (Every agent listens to 8 other agents) 
 
 
 
Table 8: SCID Experiment with SR = 10, LP = 2.00% (8 agents listened to) 
% Initial 
Dominance 
% End Dominance 
for Initial 
Dominant Identity 
Standard 
Deviation 
50 0.20 14.42% 
51 0.51 17.29% 
52 0.43 15.13% 
53 0.46 12.42% 
54 0.37 28.30% 
55 0.87 12.50% 
56 0.54 12.24% 
57 0.79 7.38% 
58 0.87 5.89% 
59 0.41 12.39% 
60 0.89 4.09% 
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Figure 9: SCID Experiment with Sight Radius 10, Listening Percentage 
2.75% (Every agent listens to 11 other agents) 
 
 
 
Table 9: SCID Experiment with SR = 10, LP = 2.75% (11 agents listened to) 
% Initial 
Dominance 
% End Dominance 
for Initial 
Dominant Identity 
Standard 
Deviation 
50 22.25% 16.49% 
51 60.79% 19.28% 
52 51.61% 10.49% 
53 67.33% 22.53% 
54 70.07% 18.06% 
55 87.54% 15.35% 
56 59.73% 20.24% 
57 58.01% 14.85% 
58 88.31% 5.78% 
59 38.93% 14.75% 
60 92.12% 6.43% 
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Appendix II: Example Landscape Photos 
Figure 10: ID Dom SR10 LP125   Figure 11: ID Dom SR10 LP200 
   
 
Figure 12: ID Dom SR1 LP6250   Figure 13: ID Dom SR10 LP200  
   
  
These photos are from the ID Dominance experiments. The SR10 
landscapes featured few clusters of agents – rather, there were agents 
sporadically scattered on opposing identities in a sea of dominant-identity agents. 
The SR1 landscapes show that, when SR is low, agents will cluster around their 
own identity – there are few rogue agents, and those that are rogue have high 
influence or are surrounded by several other identities. This experiment shows 
that as SR increases, the dominant identity gets more dominant more quickly. 
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Figure 14: SCID5050 SR1, LP 10K  Figure 15: SCID5050 SR10 LP 275 
  
 
Figure 16: SCID5545 SR1, LP 125  Figure 17: SCID6040 SR10 LP 200 
  
 
 Figures 14 through 17 are examples of the SCID landscapes. Border 
agents limit the torus at the top and bottom of the landscapes. The SR1 
landscape features clusters of agents on identities in regions. When sight range 
increases, an identity becomes more dominant, the clustering disappears, and 
the landscape may tip in any direction more quickly, overcoming (or never 
gaining) institutionalization effects. 
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Figure 18: CAS SR 1, LP 10k    Figure 19: CAS SR 10, LP 125 
                             
 
Figure 20: CAS SR 10, LP 200    Figure 21: CAS SR 10, LP 275 
                             
Figure 22: CAS SR 10, LP 350    Figure 23: CAS SR 10, LP 425 
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Figure 24: DAS SR 1, LP 10k,    Figure 25: DAS SR 10, LP 125 
                      
 
Figure 26: DAS SR 10, LP 200    Figure 27: DAS SR 10, LP 275 
                      
 
Figure 28: DAS SR 10, LP 350    Figure 29: DAS SR 10, LP 425 
   
 
These selected photos are from the Centralized and Decentralized 
Authority Structure experiments, and are taken from the 18th run in each set of 
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experiments so that the only difference between each landscape (other than 
Figure 18, where SR is 1 as opposed to 10) is due to listening percentage, or due 
to different structure type. Geographic distribution did not seem to greatly affect 
the results of this particular model. 
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